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COMMENTS

A New Place Under the Sun: Prah v.
Maretti and Common Law Solar
Access Remedies
INTRODUCTION

The legal status of a right to light is on the verge of imminent
expansion. Traditionally, American courts have refused to grant
relief to a plaintiff complaining that construction on adjoining
property blocked the free flow of sunlight.1 The doctrine of ancient
lights, a unique prescriptive easement to light and air recognized
in British common law, has been disavowed in this country for a
century and a half.' Yet now, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Prah v. Maretti4 has indicated that the plaintiff has an enforceable interest in unobstructed sunlight. The implications of
Prah, granting a cause of action in private nuisance for the blockage of a solar collector, involve a radical change in the American
jurisprudential treatment of sunlight.
The focus of this comment is on common law remedies available to solar users,' with particular emphasis on Illinois precedent.
First, the area of solar easements as a defendable property interest
will be examined. Next, the arguments by analogy to watercourse
law with close attention to the Illinois doctrine of riparian water
rights, will be outlined. Finally, the potential remedy of private
nuisance, exemplified by Prah, will be discussed. Although Illinois
precedent will be highlighted, in most jurisdictions the common
1. E.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc., 114 So. 2d
357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (construction of fourteen-story tower that blocked
swimming pool of Eden Roc Hotel during the winter months violated no legal
rights of the plaintiff Eden Roc).
2. See infra note 42.
3. See infra note 48.
4. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). See infra notes 95-137 and accompanying text.
5. For the purposes of this article, any person who has an active or passive
solar energy system, for the heating of water or space, or who converts sunlight
into an energy source by means of any device, shall be designated a "solar user."
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law requirements for all three causes of action
similar. Additionally, the change in the common
an interest in sunlight which Prah presents is so
dent in virtually every jurisdiction, as in
antithetical.

are substantially
law treatment of
novel that preceIllinois, will be

BACKGROUND

Alternative energy sources are making an impact on our energy-dependent society. Increasingly, Americans have turned to a
variety of alternative sources to supplement their energy needs,
due to the rising costs and supply variations of traditional, nonrenewable resources. In particular, large numbers of energy consumers have resorted to solar energy devices to supplement the
heating and cooling of their homes and businesses, or for the supplemental heating of water." Architectural designs intended to
maximize the natural heating and cooling of buildings are increasingly evident Furthermore, enacted federal and state legislation
demonstrates strong support for the continued use and development of solar energy as a viable alternative energy source.
6. See S. KRAEMER, SOLAR LAW PRESENT AND FUTURE, WITH PROPOSED FORMS
1-31 (1978); W. THOMAS, A. MILLER & R. ROBBINS, OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT USE OF SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 1-5 (1978). See generally Satlow,
Overview in LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY at xi (J. Minan & W. Lawrence ed.
1981).
7. See G. HAYES, SOLAR ACCESS LAW 15-16 & n.1 (1979).
8. See, e.g., S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 344-47.
9. E.g., Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96294, § 501, 94 Stat. 719 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 42
U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)) (establishing guidelines for the use of solar energy); Solar
Energy and Energy Conservation Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3620 (Supp. V
1981) (establishing the bank to provide financial assistance to owners of buildings
who install energy-conserving improvements and/or solar energy systems); Solar
Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5581-5594 (Supp. IV 1980) (promoting research in and development of
solar photovoltaic components and systems); Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5566 (1976) (providing for research and
development of solar heating systems, including establishment of components
standards); Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5917 (1976) (administrative guidelines and funding provisions
for encouragement of alternative energy development projects); Consolidated
Farm and Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1932 (Supp. V 1981) (granting
funding for rural industrialization projects, specifically for reducing reliance on
nonrenewable energy resources by developing solar energy systems.)
See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 714 (West 1982) ("[I]t is the policy of the state to
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Although no longer prohibitively high, the initial expenses incurred when modifying one's home for solar utilization are still a
major financial outlay. 10 Such a large expenditure is partially the

result of reliance, knowingly or unwittingly, on the belief that the
active device or passive design will continue to have access to all
the necessary direct sunlight." This reliance may be well-founded
due to any one of a number of means by which the solar user may
be ensured continued solar access.
For instance, the solar user may have contracted with his
neighbor to ensure the necessary access, as by restricting through

agreement the neighbor's use of his land.' 2 Such a contract would

be an express grant of an easement of light and air, which Ameripromote and encourage the use of solar energy systems and to remove obstacles
thereto."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-1 (1978) ("New Mexico recognizes that economic benefits can be derived for the people of the state from the use of solar
energy. Operations, research, experimentation and development in the field of solar energy use shall therefore be encouraged.").
10. The expense varies with the type of system used. "Active" systems generally use liquid or air to collect heat which is then transferred by means of pumps
or fans to storage areas and on into the rooms of the house. Such systems may be
used for either home or water heating. The price of an active system may run
between $10,000-$20,000 when it is intended for both space and water heating.
Alternatively, the cost may be estimated by allowing between $40 and $60 per
square foot of collector area, with the size of the necessary collector being approximately 10-50% of the total square footage of the home.
"Passive" systems use the building and its design to collect heat. Additions to
an existing home to incorporate passive heating principles may cost $5,000$10,000. Passive water heaters may range from $400-$3,000 in cost.
Both active and passive systems may be built by homeowners at costs beginning under $650. Also, favorable tax legislation in 45 states reduces the actual
costs to users. See CONSERVATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY INQUIRY AND REFERRAL
SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Fact Sheet 110 (2d ed. Dec. 1981), Fact Sheet 113
(3d ed. Dec. 1981), Fact Sheet 176 (1st ed. March 1982). See generally S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 9-31.
11. Solar energy systems work best when exposed to the maximum amount of
direct solar radiation available. To ensure the optimum operational efficiency, collectors (active or passive) should be oriented within 300 of true south, which may
vary as much as 220 from a compass reading of south. Orienting and tilting a
collector to maximize its efficiency also ensure greater access to direct light, provided the geographic location and weather conditions of the area have been taken
into account.

CONSERVATION

AND

RENEWABLE

ENERGY INQUIRY

AND

REFERRAL

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Fact Sheet 110 (2d ed. Dec. 1981), Fact Sheet 119
(1st ed. May 1980), Fact Sheet 111 (1st ed. July 1979); Letter from Larry Pavlik,
Information Specialist, Conservation and Renewable Energy Inquiry and Referral
Serv. (Sept. 9, 1982) (available at the N.I.U. Law Review Office).
12. This would be an express negative easement. See infra note 29.
SERV.,
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can courts have upheld. 3 The use of a direct grant of this type of
easement is further encouraged by statutes in numerous states
which specifically establish a "solar easement"" or "solar skyspace
easement."' 0 Often this special category of express easements is
subjected by statute to the same restrictions and requirements of
other express easements.' 6 This may include a requirement for a
concise description of the property granted, which for a solar easement is a unique problem.' 7 Additionally, as in all conveyances of
13. The maxim "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum" (The owner of
the soil owns to the sky) indicated that the law gives a property interest to the
owner of land in the airspace above the land. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 295
(3d ed. 1969).
"Easements for light can be granted because the grantor has property rights
in the airspace above the land; the right to grant the easement is only one of the
incidents of ownership of the airspace." S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 36. Hence,
courts have supported an express grant of an easement of light and air. See, e.g.,
Petersen v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1958) (express easement of light, air and unobstructed view enforceable against
subsequent owner of servient estate). See also Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557,
73 A.2d 374 (1950) (dicta indicating that easement may be acquired by express
grant); Keating v. Springer, 146 111. 481, 34 N.E. 805 (1893) (dicta expressing
opinion that authorities agree that easement to light and air may be acquired by
express grant); Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217 (1854) (dicta indicating the plaintiff
might have been successful in suit if he had pleaded and proved an express grant
of light and air).
14. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-32.5-101 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.30,
subd. 1 (West Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-204 (1982).
15. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-909 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
16. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-32.5-101 (1982) states: "Any easement obtained for the purpose of exposure of a solar energy device shall be created in
writing and shall be subject to the same conveyancing and instrument recording
requirements as other easements. . . ."; IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.7(1) (West
Supp. 1982) states: "A solar access easement whether obtained voluntarily or pursuant to the order of a solar access regulatory board is subject to the same recording and conveyance requirements as other easements."; TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9206 (1982) states: "Any [solar] easement obtained pursuant to this part shall be in
writing and shall be recorded with the register of deeds in the county in which the
land is situated."
See also Pedowitz, Solar Energy Easements, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST
J. 797, 802-03 app. (1980).
17. Statutes may indicate what means are to be used to describe the solar
easement. For instance, the "solar skyspace" defined under the Illinois statute is a
three-dimensional space measured in terms of the location of the sun at certain
times of the day during certain months of the year. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 961/2, §
7303(e)(1), (2), (3) (1981). See infra note 28.
Alternatively, the description may be in terms of angles. For example, IOWA
CODE ANN. § 564A.4(g) (West Supp. 1982) states: "A legal description of the area
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property interests, care must be taken in an express grant of a solar easement so that the terminology used reflects the interest
meant to be conveyed. 8
Alternatively, the solar user may have established a real covenant or equitable servitude, binding the neighboring landowner to
either an affirmative duty (such as trimming vegetation) or a negative restriction (such as limiting the height of any construction on
the adjoining land).1 ' Although now applied to a novel circumstance, classifications based on existing property law, as with solar
of the servient estate burdened by the easement illustrating the degrees of the
vertical and horizontal angles through which the easement extends over the burdened property and the point from which those angles are measured." See also
COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-32.5-102(1)(a) (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.30 subd. 3(b)
(West Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-204(2) (1982).

The statute may not prescribe a specific means for describing the easement,
but instead accept any of the above means. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 801.5(b)(1)
(West 1982).
The flaw with such statewide descriptions as those used in the Illinois statute
is that shadow variations for longitudinal differences are not considered. For example, a California law specifying 10:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M., in relation to standard
hours, becomes 9:43 A.M. to 1:43 P.M. at the western edge of California, and
10:25 A.M. to 2:25 P.M. at the eastern edge, at winter solstice, when the hours are
converted to actual solar time. G. HAYES, supra note 7, at 43 n.16.
Relatively simple calculations may be used to translate the variable standard
time to the static solar time, based on addition or subtraction of time per degrees
of location east or west. Id. See also id. at app. A, for detailed tables of shadow
variations based on time, latitude, and degrees of ground slope.
18. The words "lease" or "let" connote an easement of a restricted duration,
whereas "bargain and sell," "grant" and "convey" may indicate a conveyance of a
fee interest rather than an easement. "Grant" is generally the proper word when
accurately limited by the specific use to which the easement is to be put. 3 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

407 (1981).

The parties involved should take care to ensure that no interest beyond that
desired is conveyed. In First Nat'l Trust & Savings Bank v. Raphael, 201 Va. 718,
113 S.E.2d 683 (1960), the court ruled that an easement of light and air had been
granted for the benefit of the dominant estate and ran with the land. The change
in the nature of the property from residential to commercial, with the additional
fact that the windows of the dominant tenement had not been used for years, did
not result in the termination of the easement. A better solution in that case might
have been to have created the easement for the benefit of the building rather than
the land. See S. KRAEMER, supra note 6,'at 40.
In high density urban areas, such express easements, created for the benefit
of buildings rather than for that of the whole dominant estate, would allow access
to light and air without the undesirable possibility of limiting all further development of adjoining land. The destruction of the benefitted building would terminate the easement. See generally id. at 33-43.
19. See generally 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 670.
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easements, must meet the same requirements established by common law or statute in the more mundane situations.20 Thus, a real
covenant must "touch and concern" the land and must be established between parties having privity of estate who intend the covenant to run.2 1
Other extrajudicial means of ensuring or enhancing access to
sunlight have been proposed.2 For example, zoning ordinances
could be enacted which restrict the dimensions of buildings, thus
protecting access to sunlight. Solar zoning would be appropriate
for application on a city-wide basis.2 8 Also available is the use of
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 673(1).

Equitable servitudes also require that the covenant touch and concern the

land and that the parties intend the convenant to run, but additionally require
notice to the servient land owner for enforceability. Historically, real covenants
provide a remedy at law while servitudes, being an equitable cause of action, have
the equitable remedy of injunctive relief which may be more appropriate to a
solar user's claim against a neighboring blockage. Id.
The requirements for covenants in both equity and law must be met to ensure the covenant "runs with the land" rather than exists merely as a personal
agreement between the two property owners. Id. V 673(2).
Solar users might prefer to use a personal contract rather than a real covenant or equitable servitude, to allow greater flexibility in the future.
22. See, e.g., Comment, Nebraska's Legislative Responses to the Energy Crisis: Solar Energy, Gasohol and the Conservation Ethic, 60 NEB. L. REV. 327
(1981) (solar zoning and restrictive covenants) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Nebraska's Responses]; Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 94 (1977) (zoning) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Private Nuisance]; Note, Obtaining Access to Solar Energy: Nuisance, Water Rights
and Zoning Administration, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357 (1979) (solar zoning).
See generally G. HAYES, supra note 7, at 77-168, 201-14 (zoning, solar envelopes, transferable development rights); S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 57-128, 14349, 159-64 (zoning, solar covenants, transferable development rights, public
nuisance).
23. G. HAYES, supra note 7, at 77-135; S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 73-113.
Utilizing existing commissions to enforce specific solar zoning ordinances
would enable local governments to support solar access on a city or neighborhood
scale. For instance, existing setback and height restrictions, especially in low-density residential districts, might become mandatory solar zones with regulations
barring obstructions to airspace. Note, supra note 22, at 378-89.
Use of such solar zoning, as in any zoning, is a power derived from the police
power of the state, and requires enabling legislation in order to be practiced on a
local level. Care must be taken to ensure that the solar zoning ordinance relates to
public health, safety and welfare so as to be a legitimate exercise of the police
power, while not limiting the use of the affected property or reducing its value so
as to be an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. Coin-
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transferable development rights (TDRs) by which the future right
to develop property is sold to a public agency or another private
landowner.24 The landowner whose property has been restricted
thus receives compensation for his future restraint.2 The sale of
TDRs is a potentially useful device on either an individual or areawide scale.
In the absence of legislative action, solar covenants, or community solar zoning, however, a number of persons have already
installed solar devices. Illinois solar users fall within this group, for
the Comprehensive Solar Energy Act of 197726 is not a truly comprehensive statute on solar access.2 What recourse do such Illinois
residents have in the event a tree does block their solar water
heater, or a soon-to-be-constructed apartment building does curtail

their southern exposure? In the absence of any contractual or con-

sensual agreement between neighboring parties, what means of legal recourse are available to current Illinois solar users to protect
their investment?
SOLAR EASEMENT

One approach available to solar users in Illinois is a claim of a

solar skyspace easement.2

Such an easement would indicate that

ment, Assuring Legal Access to Solar Energy: An Overview with Proposed Legislation for the State of Nebraska, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 567, 615-16 (1978).
24. See G. HAYES, supra note 7, at 204-12; S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 15965.
25. TDRs have been highlighted in landmark preservation cases. See, e.g.,
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 N.E.2d
1271 (1977). Because a TDR scheme is generally neighborhood-wide, detailed examination of community goals and requirements are recommended. See G. HAVES,
supra note 7, at 204-12.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 961/2, §§ 7301 to 7316 (1981) & ch. 120, §§ 501d-1 to -3
(1981) (ch. 120 referring to solar energy state policy and definitions for revenue
purposes).
27. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
28. The Illinois statutory definitions used are:
(e) "Solar Skyspace" means (1) The maximum three dimensional
space extending from a solar energy collector to all positions of the sun
necessary for efficient use of the collector. (2) Where a solar energy system is used for heating purposes only, "solar skyspace" means the maximum three dimensional space extending from a solar energy collector to
all positions of the sun between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. Local Apparent Time
from September 22 through March 22 of each year. (3) Where a solar
energy system is used for cooling purposes only, "solar skyspace" means
the maximum three dimensional space extending from a solar energy col-
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there has been established between neighbors a property interest,
enabling the solar user to limit the development of the servient
estate if that development would hamper the effectiveness of the
solar device. The law governing solar skyspace easements would be
that which traditionally governs easements of land.2 9
Numerous states have legislatively established solar easements, ensuring judicial acceptance."0 Often such statutes require
the recording of the solar easement, similar to the recording relector to all positions of the sun between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. Local Apparent Time from March 23 through September 21.
(f) "Solar skyspace easement" means (1) a right whether or not
stated, in the form of a restriction, easement, covenant, or condition, in
any deed, will, or other instrument executed by or on behalf of any owner of land or solar skyspace or in any order of taking, appropriate to
protect the solar skyspace of a solar collector at a particularly described
location to forbid or limit any or all of the following where detrimental to
access to solar energy. (a) structures on or above ground; (b) vegetation
on or above the ground; or (c) other activity; (2) and which shall specifically describe a solar skyspace in three dimensional terms in which the
activity, structures, or vegetation are forbidden or limited or in which
such an easement shall set performance criteria for adequate collection of
solar energy at a particular location.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 962, § 7303(e), (f) (1981).
29. An easement is a nonpossessory interest in the land of another, which
enables the easement-holder to protect his interest against interference by third
parties, or from termination at the will of the possessor of the servient estate.
Such an interest is in the limited use or enjoyment of the land and may be classified as either affirmative (allowing the easement-holder to perform certain activities on the servient estate) or negative (requiring the owner of the servient estate
to refrain from certain activities). 3 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 1 405.
An easement may be created by several means: 1) By express conveyance,
required to be in writing, stating the limited purposes for which the grantor is
allowing the grantee to use his estate. Generally, this conveyance is recorded to
give notice to future purchasers of the servient estate. Id. 407. 2) By necessity,
as when the conveyor grants the inner section of his land, with no access other
than over land retained by the conveyor. An easement by necessity of right-ofway will be enforced provided there is original unity of title of both parcels, and
that the easement is not merely a convenience. Id. 410. 3) By implication, arising from particular factual settings of the claimed easement, with the requirement
of original unity of title of the parcels. Such implied easements generally are required to "have been 'apparent', 'permanent' and 'important for the enjoyment of
the conveyed [dominant] parcel'." Id. 411 at 34-82 (footnotes omitted). 4) By
prescription, on the theory of a "lost grant," when use of the easement has been
adverse, and continuous and uninterupted for the prescriptive period, set by statute. Id. 413.
30. See supra notes 14-16.
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quirements of the traditional easements.$' Illinois is currently in an
unusual position, having legislative definitions of "solar skyspace"

and "solar skyspace easement" ' but no affirmative legislative di-

rections that establish such solar easements or require that they be
recorded."3 It is uncertain whether the legislature intended to create a property interest in a solar skyspace.3 4 The opening sections
of the Comprehensive Solar Energy Act of 1977 recite a desire to
promote solar energy utilization for the public welfare of the people of Illinois, ss which indicates a positive legislative opinion to31. See supra note 16.
32. See supra note 28.
33. Thus, the Illinois statute does not specifically state that solar skyspace
easements will be recognized by courts, nor does it state that solar skyspace easements should be recorded. In fact, House Bill 1512 which would have provided
the requirements to be met for recording a solar easement died with the close of

the 1977 legislative session. H.R. 1512, 80th Leg. (1977).

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY LEGISLATION IN ILLINOIS 1977-1982

(1982). See supra note 16 and the statutory language therein for examples of state
statutes that do require the recording of solar easements.
34. Comments made in both the Illinois House of Representatives and the
Illinois Senate by sponsors of the bill enacting the Comprehensive Solar Energy
Act of 1977 did not deal with any property law repercussions:
This Bill provides for informational, technical and developmental activities regarding solar energy. There is no fiscal impact in it because the
staff is already there in the Division of Energy in the Business and Economic Development Agency .... But what this Bill does is give them
enabling legislation. [It establishes] [tihe use of incentives ... for solar
energy development and use of the facet of the solar energy development
program. And an important component of this solar energy development
program will be demonstration projects .... Public accessibility and
awareness and information collection are purposes of these
demonstrations.
Representative Geo-Karis, speaking to the House at the Third Reading of Senate
Bill 944, House Debates, 80th Session, 57th Legislative Day (June 24, 1977)
(available on microfiche at 151).
35. The statute states:
The General Assembly finds: (a) That the public health, safety, and
welfare of the People of the State of Illinois require that an adequate
supply of energy be made available to them at all times; (b) That at the
present time existing energy sources are becoming more limited; (c) That
it is the responsibility of the State government to encourage the use of
alternative renewable energy sources; (d) That solar energy systems are
an effective and feasible means of reducing the dependence of the State
government and the People of the State on non-State energy sources and
of conserving valuable fossil fuel and other non-renewable energy
sources; (e) That it is in the public interest to define solar energy systems, demonstrate solar energy feasibility, apply incentives for using so-
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ward solar energy. Additional sections outline other positive steps
to be taken, including preparation of demonstration projects,36 an
incentive program, 37 public education programs, 38 and studies of
public energy suppliers 9 and of solar energy system regulation.40
The existence of such definitions, although lacking specific procedural instructions for implementation, and the concisely articulated legislative support for solar energy, are strong persuasive authority to a hesitant court faced with a conflict over a solar
easement that the legislature intended to promote not only solar
energy in general in Illinois, but specifically solar skyspace
easements.
Explicit legislative provisions for a solar easement would
markedly enhance the success of any claim to such an easement
made by solar users in Illinois who have not established an express
contractual agreement with the obstructing property owner."' The
claim to a solar skyspace easement would be characterized as an
attempt to establish a prescriptive easement to light and air. The
British doctrine of ancient lights4 was initially followed in Illinois
lar energy, educate the public on solar feasibility, study solar energy application and coordinate governmental programs affecting solar energy.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 961/2, § 7302 (1981).
36. Id. § 7307.
37. Id. § 7308.
38. Id. § 7310.
39. Id. § 7312.
40. Id. § 7314.
41. Illinois courts have indicated a willingness to support an express grant of
access to light and air. Keating v. Springer, 146 I11. 481, 493, 34 N.E. 805, 807
(1893); Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, 224 (1854).
42. The doctrine of ancient lights grants an easement by prescription to light
and air once the plaintiff proves use of the light for the requisite prescriptive
period. Early British cases addressed the issue of the obstruction of light, indicating that the use of light must have continued for "time out of memory" for the
interest in the light to be enforceable. E.g., Palmer v. Fleshees, 83 Eng. Rep. 48
(K.B. 1675); Bowry v. Pope, 74 Eng. Rep. 155 (K.B. 1588).
The requisite time period has alternately been established as extending to
the time of the coronation of Richard I, or the year 1189, as set by the Statute of
Westminster, 13 Edw., ch. 46 (1275). Subsequent fluctuation in the prescriptive
period ranged from 60 years set by Henry VIII (31 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1534)) to 20
years (21 Jac., ch. 16 (1623), and 2 & 3 Will. 4, ch. 71 (1832)). The Rights of Light
Act, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 56 (1959), increased the period to 27 years. The repeal of
section one of the Rights to Light Act by The Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1974,
ch. 22 returned the prescriptive period to 20 years. Note, supra note 22, at 358
n.4.
The ancient lights doctrine assured the landowner who met the requisite time
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and a prescriptive right to light and air was allowed once a plaintiff
pleaded and proved "use and enjoyment [of the free flow of light
and air] for a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary. 4 3 The use of this flow of light and air over the neighboring land would not become a prescriptive easement "until it begins
to operate upon the owner's right of obstructing the light and
air." 44 The Illinois courts recognized that such a limit on the use of
one's property might result in a loss of value, 45 and reasoned that a
of
truly "ancient" easement would best safeguard the development
4s
is."
it
as
unimproved
and
state-"unsettled
land in the
The fear of restricting development of unsettled areas by the
acquisition of prescriptive easements of light and air subsequently
caused Illinois to reject its adoption of ancient lights. 47 This reversal paralleled that which occurred in other jurisdictions.4 In the
period sufficient light by which to read. The standard was the "grumble line,"
meaning that position in a room at which an ordinary person reading ordinary
print grumbles and turns on the artificial light. S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 131.
Thus, at common law there was a remedy available without a total blockage of
light.
43. Gerber, 16 Ill. at 220.
44. Id. at 223. To establish a prescriptive right to light, the servient landowner's knowledge of the invasion of his rights was presumed. The court would
only presume such knowledge, however, if the servient estate was more than a
mere vacant lot. Thus the servient landowner had to make some use of the servient estate before the prescriptive period would begin to run.
45. Id. at 219 (dicta distinguishing Illinois from England by the quantity of
vacant land which existed in Illinois and raising the question of the applicability
of the ancient lights doctrine which might limit the development of vacant lots
and hence depreciate the land's value). See also Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478,
488 (1873) (resolving the question raised in Gerber by rejecting the ancient lights
doctrine).
46. Gerber, 16 Ill. at 221. Given the two requirements of "ancient" lights going back to the time of Richard I (which the Gerber court adopted) and an actual
obstruction for the requisite period, it is questionable that such a prescriptive
right to light could ever have been established by any claimant in Illinois, despite
the language of the Gerber decision.
47. Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478, 488 (1873). See also Keating v. Springer,
146 Ill. 481, 492, 34 N.E. 805, 807 (1893).
48. E.g., Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900); Parker v.
Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. 1838).
See also Note, supra note 22, at 359 (the general rule that there could not be
an adverse use of light-necessary to establish the presumption of the servient
landowner's acquiescence required for a prescriptive claim-was primarily based
on the policy consideration of the need for land development); Comment, supra
note 23, at 579 n.77 (cases listed demonstrating rejection of ancient lights
doctrine).
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early cases, the courts expressed concern for the diminished value
of the unsettled servient estate.49 More recently, an Illinois court
has refused to consider the economic depreciation caused by the
deprivation of air, light and ventilation, holding such a loss in
5' ' 0
property value "a loss for which the law provides no remedy.
The overwhelming common law precedent against a prescriptive right to light makes it imperative to a solar easement claimant
that the legislature has expressed support for solar use. The potential economic loss to a solar user may too easily be classified as
"damnum absque injuria"' 1 by courts which have continued to
favor the developer of property over the adjoining enjoyer of light
and air, even when the loss of such light has caused economic injury to the solar user. 2 It has been proposed that the doctrine of
ancient lights could be reintroduced as a workable legal theory in a
changed social setting,5" although perhaps with a modification of
the lengthy time interval now required. 4 The doctrine originally
dealt with sufficient light by which to read, which would be quite
different from the currently proposed use.5 5 In support of the possibility of a changed setting, there is a broadening of the definition
49. "It is held to be inapplicable in a country like this, where the use, value
and ownership of land are constantly changing." Keating, 146 Ill. at 492, 34 N.E.
at 807; "It [ancient lights] .

.

. can not be applied to the growing cities and vil-

lages of this country without working the most mischievous consequences ....
Guest, 68 Il1. at 488.
50. Cain v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 26 Ill. App. 3d 574,
580, 325 N.E.2d 799, 804 (1975).
51. "Damage without wrong, the sense of the expression being that there is
no cause of action." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (3d ed. 1969).
52. E.g., FontainebleauHotel, 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). See
Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation
Doctrine, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 430 (1976) (discussing Fontainebleau Hotel).
See also Comment, supra note 23, at 580.
53. The importance of sunlight is now far more than mere illumination. Light
and air and their important aesthetic qualities are increasingly valued in both city
planning and architectural design. In fact, land with ample light and air is valued
at a higher rate than land with limited sunlight. Comment, Private Nuisance,
supra note 22, at 106.
54. One suggestion is to limit the prescriptive period to five years. Comment,
supra note 52, at 430. Shortening the prescriptive period, however, would present
potentially greater burdens on adjoining property interests, by increasing the risk
that such a prescriptive claim over one's property could be acquired with a minimum of adverse use by the party claiming the easement.
55. See supra note 42. See also Comment, supra note 52, at 430 (pointing
out the distinguishing feature between the ancient use of light and the current
use).
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of "public welfare" in Illinois zoning ordinance enforcement to include an increased awareness of aesthetics, which by analogy might
indicate a new judicial awareness of the value of light and air.5
The lack of any case law interpreting the definitions in the
Comprehensive Solar Energy Act makes it difficult to anticipate
57
the success of a prescriptive claim of solar skyspace easement.
Legislative definitions notwithstanding, it is not likely that the Illinois courts will resurrect a modern version of the doctrine of ancient lights while there remain unresolved problems of notice of
the prescriptive claim and of the running of the time limit. Thus,
although an argument may be made for a solar easement by prescriptive right, sole reliance on such a claim would be tenuous. The
possibility exists, however, that the impact of Prah may spread beyond nuisance law and permeate other property areas related to
sunlight. If so, the revival of a prescriptive right to light may be
more seriously considered by the courts. In such a case, a statutory
solar easement will strengthen the claim; the existence of only legislative definitions, although not as persuasive, will certainly be
noteworthy.
WATERCOURSE LAW

A second approach for dealing with the new uses and demands
for unrestricted sunlight would be to rely on other, established areas of natural resource law for analogous arguments. Oil and gas
laws have been suggested,5 but are distinguishable on the grounds
56. La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 Ill. 2d 415, 432, 312 N.E.2d
625, 634 (1974) ("[T]here would appear to be significant authority that aesthetic
factors may, in some instances, be utilized as the sole basis to validate a zoning
classification .

. . .");

Ward v. County of Cook, 68 Ill. App. 3d 563, 571, 386

N.E.2d 309, 316 (1979) (citing La Salle).
57. Since the legislature did not specifically establish a definite property
right called a "solar skyspace easement," it is hard to ascertain the effect on property law in Illinois. But see Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284
(7th Cir. 1977) and Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 432
N.E.2d 849 (1982) (both citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which gives a fourpart test for implying a private cause of action from legislation: (1) the plaintiff is
within the group for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) legislative history
indicates an intent to create a remedy; (3) the cause of action is consistent with
the underlying legislative scheme; (4) the cause of action is traditionally associated with a state, rather than a federal law).
58. Oil and gas both must be "captured" to develop their energy potential,
which is somewhat analogous to the need to "capture" the sunlight by means of
an active or passive solar device in order to maximize its heating capabilities.
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that applicable doctrines in those fields deal with ownership rights,
whereas an interest in sunlight is of a usufructuary nature.6 Watercourse law is potentially the most analogous doctrine of natural
resources to sunlight access due to its similar usufructuary nature, 60 as well as the similarities of the "stream of sunlight" and
the stream of water."
American watercourse law follows two major theories and
breaks roughly into an east-west division. The prior appropriation
doctrine,6 ' whereby priority of rights are set by the chronology of
the user's claim, is followed mainly in the western states" and has
already been explicitly adopted by one legislature as the analogous
However, both oil and gas law deal with ownership rights, and the relevant doctrines accordingly emphasize the importance of title in terms of capture, pooling
and correlative rights of surface owners. Also, oil and gas laws currently are inextricably mixed with leasing and taxation laws. See Comment, supra note 52, at
428-29.
59. A usufructuary right is "[t]he right to the use, enjoyment, profits, and
avails of property belonging to another." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (3d
ed. 1969). See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
60. "There are some few things which . .. must still unavoidably remain in
common, being such wherein nothing but a usufructuary property is capable of
being had; . . . Such (among others) are the elements of light, air and water,

which a man may occupy by means of his windows, his gardens, his mills, and
other conveniences. . . ." 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 1 710 at 351 n.5, quoting 2
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 14, 18.
See also Comment, supra note 52, at 434 ("Sunlight itself is used, not captured and sold. Potential sales will be of products of sunlight, not the resource
itself.").
61. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22, at 368 ("Streams of light may be analogized to surface watercourses insofar as rights to both attach to the flow and not
the corpus."); Comment, supra note 52, at 435 ("Some uses of water, as in agriculture, are necessarily consumptive, and thus take the water away from the natural
stream. Most uses of sunlight are likewise 'consumptive.' "); Comment, Private
Nuisance, supra note 22, at 104 (sunlight characterized as one of the "freeflowing
elements that no one person can possess").
62. The prior appropriation doctrine, with state-to-state variations, establishes a property right in stream water based on: a) priority in time of claim; b)
suitability, importance and quantity of use; and c) ascertainability of the diversion or use of water. Statutory and even constitutional provisions are significant
not only in clarifying the superior public right, but also in defining permissive
uses. The key policy of the prior appropriation doctrine is the maximizing of a
vital, limited resource. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 1 735-736.
63. Seventeen arid and semi-arid western states rely on the doctrine of prior
appropriation: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. 1 733.
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doctrine for solar access.64 It has been argued that because prior

appropriation is the doctrine of the drier states where there has
been more litigation over water, the details of the doctrine have
been more clearly resolved.65 In contrast, there has been criticism
of the prior appropriation doctrine because it is based on a "first in
time, first in right" concept that is neither flexible nor fair.ss But
because the doctrine relies on a permit system, 7 prior appropriation might serve the unique needs of urban areas with high density
populations.s
The second watercourse theory, exemplified by Illinois common law, 9 is that of riparian use. 0 Some aspects of this doctrine
64. New Mexico has added the following section:
B. The following concepts shall be applicable to the regulation of
disputes over the use of solar energy where practicable: .

.

. (2) "prior

appropriation." In disputes involving solar rights, priority in time shall
have the better right except that the state and its political subdivisions
may legislate, or ordain that a solar collector user has a solar right even
though a structure or building located on neighborhood property blocks
the sunshine from the proposed solar collector site.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4(B) (1978).
65. The details of intent, notice, beneficial use, diversion, and reasonable diligence (all of which are generally required for a claim under the prior appropriation doctrine) have been clarified by numerous case decisions as well as statutory
enactments. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 174 Colo. 309, 486 P.2d 438 (1971) (definite intent for appropriation for project established by date of final decision to proceed, not by the earlier
date of land surveying); Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Gulley, 53 Nev. 163, 295 P. 771
(1931) (regular and repeated stock watering constituted a diversion of stream);
AMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-150 (1956) (statutory standards for reasonable diligence). See also Comment, supra note 52, at 437-41 nn.69, 84 & 89.
66. The race-to-the-courthouse inherent in the prior appropriation doctrine
does not easily lend itself to an evaluation of the equities involved in individual
cases. Comment, supra note 23, at 606-07.
However, the requirement of beneficial use might be adaptable to instill flexibility. Compare Comment, supra note 52, at 439-40 (supporting this possibility)
with Comment, supra note 23, at 606-07 (refuting suitability of beneficial use).
67. See supra notes 62 & 65.
68. The restricted airspace of high density urban areas is comparable to the
limited availability of water in prior appropriation states. A permit system ensures beneficial use and allows control of the amount of solar access required.
Note, supra note 22, at 371-74.
69. E.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842) (each riparian
landowner may consume all the stream water needed to meet his natural wants,
but water used for artificial needs is to be divided on the basis of the needs of the
circumstances).
70. The American version of riparian watercourse law evolved from the Eng-
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make it more appropriate for rural or suburban areas.7 1 For Illinois
solar users, the use of an analogy to the riparian doctrine would
have the benefit of applying a law with which the court is familiar.7 2 Also, the Illinois watercourse common law provides an analysis of riparian ownership rights which is well suited for adoption by
analogy to "stream of sunlight" ownership rights.7 3 The Illinois
courts have repeatedly held that the rights of riparian owners in
the natural stream flowing over their property is a usufructuary
right, and that rights of the upstream user must be limited by the
need of the downstream owner.7 The balance of their respective
rights is made on the basis of the reasonableness of use.76
lish law of natural flow, allowing the riparian landowner unlimited use of the
stream for domestic purposes, and a right to the flow of the stream in its natural
unspoiled condition, undiminished in quantity. Most eastern American states
tempered the natural flow doctrine by adopting a reasonable use standard, which
governed the utilization of the water by considering factors such as the purpose,
quantity, and destination of the use. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 1 711-715.
71. As the riparian doctrine originated and flourished where water was abundant, so the doctrine by analogy is appropriate for areas where skyspace is abundant. The fact that most residentially-zoned suburban areas have similar use and
minimum lot size requirements ensures open airspace. Note, supra note 22, at
369-71. See supra note 68 (urban areas with dissimilar lot usages more suitable
for prior appropriation analogy).
72. Some of the benefits include "familiarity with the basic principles of allocation and local variations, efficient use of the research and study applied to other
areas, avoidance of ad hoc piecemeal decisions within the state, and regularity of
expectations for resource users." Comment, supra note 52, at 436.
73. See supra notes 60 & 61.
74. The law has been long settled, in this State, that there can be no
property merely in the water of a running stream. The owner of land
over which a stream of water flows, has, as incident to his ownership of
the land, a property right in the flow of the water at that place for all the
beneficial uses that may result from it, whether for motive power in propelling machinery, or in imparting fertility to the adjacent soil, etc.,-in
other words, he has a usufruct in the water while it passes; but all other
riparian proprietors have precisely the same rights in regard to it ....
Druley v. Adam, 102 Ill. 177, 193 (1882).
75. See Tetherington v. Donk Bros. Coal Co., 232 Ill. 522, 525, 83 N.E. 1048,
1049 (1908) (co-equal rights of riparian owners to reasonable use of the stream in
its natural and unpolluted state entitled lower user to recover damages for pollution caused by the dumping of coal mine refuse by upstream user); Bliss v. Kennedy, 43 Ill. 67, 76 (1867) (competing industrial users of stream required to share
stream water so as to meet their respective needs); Evans, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) at 496.
76. "The right of each proprietor to use the stream is subject to a like reasonable right in other riparian owners, and each must submit to such reasonable use
by his neighbor . . . " Tetherington, 232 Ill. at 525, 83 N.E. at 1049.
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A balance of the competing interests of the upstream user and
the downstream potential user based on the reasonableness of use,
rather than a strict claim of ownership," favors the adoption of
riparian watercourse law to solar access situations, where use of
sunlight is more easily demonstrable than ownership of the sunlight. Reasonableness requires that neither user divert more than
can be put to beneficial purposes," unless the purpose is to serve a
natural need.7 9 Additionally, Illinois law supports contractual
agreements between riparian landowners.80 Subjecting solar access
to the same test of reasonableness would allow flexible allocation of
sunlight between competing users. 81 Perhaps more weight should
be given to the claim of the solar user who relies on his solar energy system for a large percentage of his heat or hot water, as a use
serving his natural needs.8 2
The use of riparian watercourse law does permit a case-bycase approach, relying on the facts of the individual situation to
determine the rights of the parties. Although this is potentially a
costly and time-consuming process,8 3 it does allow a more gradual
resolution of conflicts in the very new area of solar access law.
However, as in any argument by analogy, the court may not accept
the analogy and may reject the usufructuary claim to sunlight in
77. Although no watercourse law theory is based on ownership of the stream
water, the prior appropriation doctrine is much less flexible than the riparian doctrine. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
78. The riparian rights of property owners abutting on the same body of
water are co-equal. Such rights being equal, the general rule is that no
riparian owner can exercise his riparian rights in such a way as to prevent the exercise of the same right by the owners of other riparian rights.
Bouris v. Largent, 94 Ill. App. 2d 251, 254, 236 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1968). See also
Evans, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) at 496.
79. See, e.g., Bliss, 43 Ill. at 74; Evans, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) at 496.
80. "It necessarily results from this joint ownership of the water in the
stream, that the proprietors of the property on both sides of the stream have the
right to make some arrangement with each other for the joint use of the water of
the stream." Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Adam, 179 Ill. 406, 433, 53 N.E. 743, 752
(1899).
81. For example, the interest of the property owner with the tree versus the
interest of the property owner with the solar energy system.
82. The special protection given necessities under the riparian doctrine
would support this. See supra note 70.
83. See Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 248, 321 N.W.2d 182, 195 (1982)
(Callow, J., dissenting) (citing Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeinga Place in
the Sun, 57 OR. L. REV. 94, 126-27 for espousing the view that legislation is a
more cost efficient means to establish solar access principles).
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its entirety.84
PRIVATE NUISANCE

The third non-legislative approach which would be available
to Illinois solar users would be a private nuisance argument for the
blockage of sunlight needed for the collector or system. The law of
private nuisance serves to relieve the plaintiff of an interference
with the reasonable use and enjoyment of his land 8 5 caused by
some activity of the defendant." It is required that the plaintiff
84. Note that the Prahcourt was presented with a watercourse analogy argument by the plaintiff, but did not address the issues thus raised. See infra text
accompanying notes 103 & 107.
85. "The essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 591
(4th ed. 1971).
Originally, the cause of action for private nuisance was a criminal writ of the
assize of nuisance, which granted incidental civil relief for an invasion of the
plaintiff's land caused by conduct wholly on the defendant's land. The action on
the case for nuisance, which gradually evolved, granted relief strictly for an interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. Id. § 86. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D comment a (1979). (It may be noted that

the cause of action of public nuisance, which developed separately, originally
dealt with encroachments upon the royal domain or the public highway. W. PROSSER, supra, § 86).
The interference must be substantial and must be of a nature for which the
court will grant relief. Physical injury to the plaintiff or his property may persuade a court to grant relief more readily than when the damage is less tangible,
as when the defendant's activity causes personal inconvenience or annoyance. It
must be more than petty annoyances. In many instances, there is also involved a
continuous or repeated interference. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 705; W.
PROSSER, supra, § 87; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 821F comment
C.

The interest involved may not be only in the present use of the land, but also
in the unimpaired value of the land, and in the enjoyment of land free from discomfort and annoyance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 821D comment b. See also id. § 821E.
The Restatement offers factors for determining the gravity of the harm
caused (including the extent and character of the harm involved), and suggests
the harm be balanced against the suitability and social value of the plaintiff's use

and the burden on the plaintiff to avoid the harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra, § 827.

86. The defendant's activity may be either intentional or negligent. A third
area, involving ultrahazardous activities, is not relevant to the current discussion.
See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 705. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 87.
The defendant's activity need not be an actual invasion, although trespass
was at one time distinguished from nuisance as being a direct rather than indirect
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have an interest in land87 and that he not be especially susceptible
to harm.88 The defendant's activity may be enjoined 9 or damages
may be granted9" when the social value of that activity is less than
the social value placed on the plaintiff's enjoyment of his land.9 '
physical invasion. Generally, the two causes of action are now distinguishable as
an interference with possession (trespass) versus an interference with the use and
enjoyment of the land (nuisance). The difference in a given situation may be nonexistent (as when the plaintiff's land is flooded, depriving him of possession, use
and enjoyment) but is relevant insofar as the statute of limitations for trespass
begins to run when the land is invaded, whereas the nuisance statute of limitations begins only when the interference has caused substantial harm. W. PROSSER,
supra note 85, § 89. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 85, §
821D, comments d & e.
87. Thus a tenant or easement holder would have a cause of action whereas a
licensee or lodger would not. W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 89. See also 5 R. PowELL, supra note 18, 705.
88. "To the. extent that the claimed harm becomes more subjective, the likelihood of relief is decreased." 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 1 705. The standard of
the character of the interference used by the court is "that of definite offensiveness, inconvenience or annoyance to the normal person in the community ....
The plaintiff cannot, by devoting his own land to an unusually sensitive use, ...
make a nuisance out of conduct of the adjoining defendant which would otherwise
be harmless." W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 87, at 578-79. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS,

supra note 85, § 821F comment d.

The significance of this standard for a solar user is readily apparent: if the
court characterizes the use of solar devices as supersensitive in nature, the cause
of action in private nuisance will fail, and relief will be denied. The decision of the
court in Prah becomes especially important in this regard. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
89. The granting of the equitable remedy of an injunction has long been a
recognized remedy for a private nuisance claim and may be granted prior to actual harm. See W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 90.
"The wrongful conduct is commonly recurrent, causing a multiplicity of suits
at law, while equity can give complete relief in a single action. Furthermore, nuisance involves harm to land, for which money damages are traditionally said to be
inadequate." 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 707, at 344.1.
90. The legal remedy of damages will be based on the specific losses suffered
by the plaintiff, as well as the value attached to the use and enjoyment of which
he has been deprived. W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 90. Additionally, a limited
remedy of abatement by self-help exists. Id.; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 18, 1 707.
91. The defendant's conduct is held to a standard of reasonableness, and the
social utility of his activities are considered when the court examines the harm
suffered by the plaintiff. Those uses which are of higher utility to society will be
less likely to be enjoined than activities with little or no social value. Thus, relief
may be granted concerning a foul-smelling pond but not concerning an airport or
oil refinery. W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 89.
The social utility of the defendant's conduct is also a factor in establishing
the suitability of the defendant's activities to the location and the practicability
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For several reasons, private nuisance appears to be the preferable legal doctrine for Illinois solar users. First, the absence of judicial interpretation of the statutory definitions makes reliance on
them tenuous.9" Second, current users may have installed their systems without obtaining any express skyspace easement which
could be enforced by the courts. Third, the use of a private nuisance theory allows argumentation following an existing and traditional theory, rather than the use of the more radical approach of
solar easement in the absence of indisputable legislative direction.98 Lastly, as in the adoption of watercourse law, private nuisance claims use a case-by-case approach which facilitates the
more gradual resolution of solar use problems." '
Prah v.Maretti
A recently decided Wisconsin case lends considerable support
to the establishment of a cause of action under the theory of private nuisance for interference with a solar collector.95 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the plaintiff stated a claim for which
relief could be granted when he filed suit seeking to enjoin the
property owner to the south from building his colonial home closer
than twenty-five feet from the common boundary line."' The plaintiff had built his home in 1979 and installed a solar heating system
at a cost of $18,000 which was to provide part of the hot water
of avoiding the interference. See

§ 828.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 85,

92. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
93. The benefits of following a traditional theory include familiarity with the
doctrine and clarification of details. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
"The advantage of applying old law to new situations is that courts and citizens
feel comfortable with laws they are used to. It also makes sense to avoid writing
new laws if they are unnecessary." G. HAYES, supra note 7, at 169.
94. Conflicts over solar access are in essence no different from other conflicts
involving the use of property. As such, the "centuries-long evolution of rules governing the relationships between property owners" provides stability and predictability; yet on individual bases, solutions may be found which adapt the law to
the demands placed upon it by changes in society and technology. Zillman, Common-Law Doctrines and Solar Energy in LEG.AL ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra
note 6, at 25. By way of contrast, see supra note 83 for Justice Callow's dissenting
view in Prah that legislation is more cost effective.
95. Prah v. Maretti 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
96. Id. at 225, 321 N.W.2d at 192; Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States
of America at 6, Prah.
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needs and all of the heating needs for the home.9" The proposed
construction by the defendant originally would have placed the
new home within ten feet of the property line. This would have
blocked the collectors during part of the winter, causing them to
freeze and resulting in serious damage. 98 At an Architectural Control Board (ACB) meeting, the plaintiff sought to have the defendant's proposed home placed fifteen feet further back, thus leaving
the collectors exposed throughout the winter. 99 There was a factual
dispute as to whether or not the parties agreed to the new location,100 although the affidavits of two ACB members indicated that
the defendant did agree.101 However, plans subsequently filed by
the defendant showed the house again ten feet from the boundary
line, and on October 9, 1980, the defendant began construction.
Four days later the plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court of Waukesha County, seeking a temporary injunction barring construction
of the home.
At the trial court's hearing to consider the motion, the plaintiff presented three arguments: (1) that the Wisconsin statutes
provided a remedy by permitting the bringing of an action for
damage to real property;' 0° (2) that the construction of the neighboring home interfered with a solar easement acquired by the
plaintiff under the doctrine of prior appropriation;103 and (3) that
construction of the home was a private nuisance under the common law. 04 The court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted
97. Brief, supra note 96, at 5.
98. Brief, supra note 96, at 6. The danger of a shadow being cast in winter is
avoided by determining the shadow cast by the sun on December 21, and using
that as the lowest boundary of the easement. CONSERVATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY INQUIRY AND REFERRAL SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., Fact
Sheet 111 (1st ed. July 1979). See also S. KRAEMER, supra note 6, at 34.
99. Brief, supra note 96, at 6.
100. 108 Wis. 2d at 226 n.2, 321 N.W.2d at 185 n.2.

101. Brief, supra note 96, at 6.
102. 108 Wis. 2d at 229, 321 N.W.2d at 186. The plaintiff relied on WIS. STAT.

§ 844.01 (1979), which provides in part:

(1) Any person owning or claiming an interest in real property may bring
an action claiming physical injury to, or interference with, the property

or his interest therein;

(3) Interference with an interest is any activity other than physical injury
which lessens the possibility of use or enjoyment of the interest.

103. 108 Wis. 2d at 230, 321 N.W.2d at 186. See supra notes 62 & 65.
104. 108 Wis. 2d at 229, 321 N.W.2d at 186. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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summary judgment for the defendant. 105
On appeal from the summary judgment, the state supreme
court first clarified that it was seeking to test the sufficiency of the
complaint and hence would accept as true all facts pleaded by the
plaintiff.'" The court then proceeded to analyze the plaintiff's
claim under the private nuisance doctrine. 107

Recently decided cases in Wisconsin had adopted the private
nuisance analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; 08 hence,
the Prah court cited the Restatement at length. 10 9 Additionally,
the majority opinion stated that the "private nuisance doctrine has
traditionally been employed in this state to balance the rights of
landowners."" 0 The balancing of interests, as detailed in the Restatement, was not, however, the original policy of the Wisconsin
common law. Initially, the Wisconsin courts had required a physical injury to the plaintiff's property before allowing a cause of action for private nuisance."' Even construction of an eyesore out of
pure malice was not actionable.112 Gradually, however, the Wisconsin courts recognized a private nuisance for "unreasonable interference with the interest of an individual in the use or enjoyment of
land,"" 8 and noted that such interference could even be the result
of only negligent conduct."" The adoption of the Restatement
standards was a logical step in the progressively wider cause of ac105. 108 Wis. 2d at 227, 321 N.W.2d at 184.
106. Id. at 229, 321 N.W.2d at 186.
107. The majority opinion specifically stated that the possible causes of action under the theories of prior appropriation and statutory violation were not
addressed. Id. at 242-43, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
108. E.g., CEW Management Corp. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 88 Wis.
2d 631, 277 N.W.2d 766 (1979) (defendant's failure to prevent erosion onto plaintiff's property following building construction on defendant's property constituted
a cause of action in private nuisance; failure to act, as indicated in RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oF TORTS, supra note 85, § 824, may impose liability); State v. Deetz, 66
Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974) (reasonableness of defendant's use of land must
be considered in determining utility of defendant's conduct). See supra notes 8588 and accompanying text.
109. 108 Wis. 2d at 231-32, 241, 321 N.W.2d at 187, 190-91.
110. Id. at 231, 321 N.W.2d at 187.
111. Thus, a spite fence made of "rough, old, unsightly and partly decayed"
lumber taken from an old ice house did not constitute an actionable private nuisance. Metzger V. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 268, 83 N.W. 308, 309 (1900).
112. Id.
113. Hoene v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 116 N.W.2d 112, 115
(1962).
114. Id.

[1982:187/]

SOLAR ACCESS REMEDIES

tion in private nuisance recognized by the Wisconsin court.
Despite this liberalization of the doctrine of private nuisance,
the Wisconsin common law remained traditionally reluctant to recognize a legal interest in sunlight."' Thus, in order to ascertain
whether the plaintiff had stated a claim supportable under the private nuisance doctrine, the Prah court analyzed the unique treatment of light and air in the law, both the general jurisprudential
background and the specific Wisconsin precedent."" The majority
referred to the early American acceptance and later rejection of
the doctrine of ancient lights." 7 Wisconsin common law had been
even more strict than other American state courts, refusing to enjoin even intentional interferences, such as spite fences."' As in
other jurisdictions, the early decisions in Wisconsin did not favor
easements of light and air." 9 The overwhelming concern for development of land meant that only if the easement for light and air
was expressly granted and clearly stated would such an easement
be upheld.2 0
The majority of the Prah court identified three reasons
why nineteenth and early twentieth century courts failed to protect a property interest in light and then noted why such reasons
were no longer appropriate.' 21 First, the earlier courts "jealously
guarded"'2' the property owner's freedom to use his property in
any way he desired, limited only by a requirement not to do physical harm to the property of a neighbor."12 The Prah court majority
noted that this freedom had been curtailed by zoning laws, indicat115. See cases cited infra note 119.
116. 108 Wis. 2d at 233-34, 321 N.W.2d at 188.
117. Id. at 233, 321 N.W.2d at 188. See supra note 42.
118. Metzger, 107 Wis. at 269, 83 N.W. at 309. See also supra note 111.
119. E.g., Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851,
853 (1930) (lease of hotel adjoining a vacant lot would not be construed to include
an easement to light and air); Miller v. Hoeschler, 126 Wis. 263, 105 N.W. 790,
792 (1905) (no easement of light and air acquired by plaintiff over strip of land
belonging to defendant, despite strip's use by plaintiff as front yard).
120. "No words need be used to withhold an easement of light and air, but to
words must be employed which clearly show the intention to give
create one [,]
such an easement." Depner, 202 Wis. at 408, 232 N.W. at 853. Thus, a lease of
"Hotel Kenosha and appurtenances" would not be construed as an express grant
of an easement of light and air without the use of specific words. Id. See also
Miller, 126 Wis. at 270, 105 N.W. at 792.
121. 108 Wis. 2d at 235-36, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
122. Id.
123. E.g., Metzger, 107 Wis. at 272, 83 N.W. at 310.
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ing increasing regulation of one's property.12" Second, the previous
uses of sunlight were limited to aesthetic or illuminative purposes;
however, the increasing utilization of sunlight as an energy source
required a new judicial perspective.' 2 Third, the overriding and
repeated concern of the earlier courts was the potential for unimpeded development of the land.12 6 Such emphasis on unrestricted
development, according to the Prah court, is "no longer in har27
mony with the realities of our society.'
Given the change in societal concerns, as well as recent precedent in tempering common law doctrines to fit newer, more vital
interests, 2 8 the court held that the law of private nuisance was applicable to the instant case. 2 9 Hence, the same reasonable use

standard would apply to future situations of obstructions of sunlight. Further, the court reemphasized its intention not to inhibit
land development, but to allow flexibility in the face of competing
landowners' interests.8 0 The decision of the circuit court was re-

versed, and the case was remanded so that the parties might present the evidence needed for the court to rule on the "reasonableness" of the plaintiff's use. "

124. 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189, citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning ordinance restricting areas of city to strictly residential use was a valid exercise of police power despite the fact that plaintiff's
iand in that area had market value of $10,000 per acre if used for industry, and
only $2,500 per acre if used residentially) and citing Just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (shoreland zoning ordinance seeking to protect
wetlands from uncontrolled use and development was constitutional, hence plaintiff as property owner was prohibited from using fill on his wetland property).
125. 108 Wis. 2d at 236 & n.11, 321 N.W.2d at 189 & n.11.
126. "The cistern, the outhouse, the cesspool, and the private drain must disappear in deference to the public waterworks and sewer; the terrace and the garden, to the need for more complete occupancy.

.

. ."

Miller, 126 Wis. at 270, 105

N.W. at 791, quoted in Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
127. 108 Wis. 2d at 238, 321 N.W.2d at 190, quoting Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 1415, 224 N.W.2d at 414.
128. See, e.g., Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (common law "common
enemy" rule of surface water, allowing landowner total latitude to rid property of
surface water, replaced by "reasonable use" as determined by the balancing approach of the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS).

129. 108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
130. Id. at 239, 321 N.W.2d at 191. Private nuisance is particularly adaptable
to such flexibility. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 85, §
827 (gravity of harm) with id. § 828 (utility of conduct). See also supra notes 85
& 91.
131. The application of the reasonable use standard in nuisance cases
normally requires a full exposition of all underlying facts and circum-
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In the sole dissent, Justice Callow refuted the majority's pre-

mise that changes in society call for a new perspective on a land-

owner's right of access to sunlight. He emphasized that the court

should uphold a landowner's right to use his property freely,

within the limits of ordinances and statutes;132 he questioned the
economic value and efficiency of solar collectors; 3 ' and he argued
that the majority ignored continued public interest in land development.1 34 Further, Justice Callow criticized the court for intruding into an area of legislative, not judicial, concern.13 5 Finally, the
dissenting justice noted that in the instant case the record failed to

indicate that the plaintiff "disclosed his situation""' to the defen-

dant prior to the latter's purchase of the lot and argued that inaction by the plaintiff should be considered when granting a cause of

action.13

7

IMPACT OF

Prah

By allowing a cause of action for obstruction of a solar energy
system, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken an innovative position. The long line of precedent repeatedly rejecting any claims
stances. Too little is known in this case of such matters as the extent of
the harm to the plaintiff, the suitability of solar heat in that neighborhood, the availability of remedies to the plaintiff, and the costs to the
defendant of avoiding the harm.
108 Wis. 2d at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
132. 108 Wis. 2d at 246-47, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting).
133. "Solar energy for home heating is at this time sparingly used and of
questionable economic value because solar collectors are not mass produced, and
consequently, they are very costly. Their limited efficiency may explain the lack
of production." Id. at 247, 321 N.W.2d at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting).
The dissent did not support this statement. The actual expense of solar collectors may be quite modest. See supra note 10.
134. 108 Wis. 2d at 247, 321 N.W.2d at 194-95 (Callow, J., dissenting). Justice Callow conceded that "the law may be tending to recognize the value of aesthetics over increased volume development," but supported the need for volume
land development by emphasizing "the present housing shortages." Id.
135. Id. at 248, 321 N.W.2d at 194-95. Although Justice Callow referred specifically to solar access, the establishment of a cause of action in private nuisance
has historically been a judicial concern. See supra note 85 (history of the private
nuisance cause of action).
136. 108 Wis. 2d at 256, 321 N.W.2d at 199 (Callow, J., dissenting). The Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States indicated the defendant did have notice at
least at the time he sought the approval of the ACB in August, 1980. Brief, supra
note 96, at 6.
137. 108 Wis. 2d at 256, 321 N.W.2d at 199 (Callow, J., dissenting).
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of a legal interest in light and air has been given its first setback.1 38
Recognition of a defendable interest in sunlight serves as an acknowledgment by the court of the new uses to which light is put.
Whereas previously sunlight for aesthetic or illuminative purposes
was not a legal interest which the courts would uphold, 3" the Prah
decision established that sunlight used as an energy source is substantially different. Access to light has become a potential appurtenance to land which may, under certain conditions, be a defendable legal interest.
The recognition of this interest in sunlight also demonstrates
the beginning of the necessary recognition by the law of the technological realities of modern society. Just as courts gradually
adapted traditional tort concepts of reasonable care to the realities
of railroad traffic,14 0 and property concepts of trespass to the advent of air travel, 41 so now the Wisconsin court's decision serves as
the first step toward legal recognition of the technological aspects
of solar energy.
Additionally, the Prah court has implicitly established that a
solar collector is not a "supersensitive use" per se.1 ' The summary
judgment denying a cause of action would have been affirmed if
the solar collector was a sensitive use as a matter of law. A successful claim in private nuisance requires that the injured party's use
be reasonable, and that the plaintiff not have contributed to his
own harm.13 Arguably, relying on sunlight for heat could have
been viewed as so specialized as to be beyond court-granted re138. See, e.g., supra note 1 (decision in FontainebleauHotel denying relief
for blockage of sunlight); supra notes 47 & 48 (cases rejecting an interest in light
and air).

139. See, e.g., supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (Illinois precedent
refuting a claim to a prescriptive easement to light and air); supra note 111 and
accompanying text (Wisconsin precedent denying a private nuisance claim to
light).

140. "When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a
place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of the
track .

. .

.

In such circumstances

. . .

a driver

. . .

must stop and get

out of his

vehicle. . . ." Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927), criticized in W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 35, at 188.
141. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (limiting the upper extent
of property ownership so as to allow air travel without claims of trespass). Cf.
supra note 13 (no limitations on maxim that the owner of the soil owns to the
sky).
142. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 827.
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lief. 44 The willingness of the court to examine additional factors
beyond the mere use of a solar collector, and the subsequent remanding for additional factual determination supports not only
the argument that solar devices will not always be viewed automatically as supersensitive, but also that the use of solar collectors
may in fact be a reasonable use of one's property.
Finally, the court has granted injunctive relief to the plaintiff
pending further factual determination. For a solar user who has
invested in a solar energy system, injunctive relief is preferable to
damages. Final determination of the Prah dispute will be most significant in establishing precedent for the relief to be granted in
future cases.
In order for Illinois solar users to capitalize on the new opportunity presented by the Prah decision, the private nuisance claim
must be supported by Illinois precedent. A private nuisance in Illinois has been defined as "an individual wrong arising from an unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use of one's property producing such material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt
that the law will presume a consequent damage.'

45

Thus, the

plaintiff must prove both "unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use" by the offending party, and "material annoyance, inconvenience [or] discomfort" caused. These terms are substantially the
same as those used by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 14' The
harm caused by the obstruction of the sunlight would be actionable, especially where there would be resulting damage to the collector itself, as was the case in Prah. 47 In applying the Restatement
standard, reasonableness of the use which blocks the light would

144. Both amici curiae briefs submitted to the Wisconsin Supreme Court argued that solar collectors should not be considered sensitive per se. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Natural Resources Defense Council at 11; Brief, supra note 96, at
19-24.
145. Merriam v. McConnell, 31 Ill. App. 2d 241, 244, 175 N.E.2d 293, 295
(1961) (annual infestation of box elder bugs alone not sufficient for the court to
grant relief, without some action on the part of the defendant), citing Gardner v.
International Shoe, 319 Ill.
App. 416, 433, 49 N.E.2d 328, 335 (1943) (operations
of the defendant tannery were permitted to continue, despite noxious odors which

were viewed as a necessary part of urban life).
See also Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 131 Ill. 322, 326, 23 N.E. 389,
390 (1890) (storage of dynamite by defendant on his property, which subsequently
exploded, constituted nuisance).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 821F.
147. Brief, supra note 96, at 19-20. The more easily the court may discover a
physical injury, the more readily it will grant relief. See supra note 85.
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be determined by a variety of factors, including the social value of
the use invaded and the burden on the person harmed. ""' The inclusion of such factors bodes well for Illinois users, as it demonstrates a flexibility which was not apparent in earlier cases. " 9 This
balancing approach is based on the same authority which was persuasive to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Prah.50
Implicit in the balancing of landowners' interests, which is involved in a claim of private nuisance, is the requirement that one's
use of the land not be special and delicate. 51 The standard for
private nuisance remains that of a person of ordinary sensibilities,1"' which usually is not an issue of fact. " What constitutes a
sensitive use would vary with its plentifulness so that while a single solar user might be special, a majority in the community with
solar devices would be the norm against which sensitivity could be
measured.1 5 4 There is also a policy decision made by the court
when it determines whether a use is unusually sensitive or not.1 55
The Prah decision, regardless of the final outcome in the individual situation, has given credence to a determination that a solar
collector is a reasonable, not special, use by allowing the facts of
the particular circumstance to control.
CONCLUSION

Current Illinois solar users do not have strong legislative pro148. E.g., Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 77 Ill. App. 3d
(SEcOND) OF TORTS, supra note

478, 395 N:E.2d 1193 (1979) (citing RESTATEMENT
85, § 827). See supra note 85.

149. Cf. Belmar Drive-In Theatre v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 34

Ill. 2d 544, 548-49, 216 N.E.2d 788, 791-92 (1966) (drive-in theatre a special use as
a matter of law and not entitled to relief); Merriam, 31 Ill. App. 2d at 248, 175
N.E.2d at 297 (box elder bugs).

In neither case was there any discussion of the relative utility of the conduct
of the defendants, or the land use by the plaintiffs. Both decisions took strict

doctrinal stances granting no relief if no act by the defendant was argued, or if
the plaintiff's use was special.
150. Great Att. & Pac. Tea Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d at 485, 395 N.E.2d at 1198-99;
and Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 241 n.16, 321 N.W.2d at 192 n.16, both quoting RE-

OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 827 (listing factors for use in
determining gravity of harm caused).
151. See, e.g., Belmar Drive-In, 34 Ill. 2d at 547-48, 216 N.E.2d at 791. See
STATEMENT (SECOND)

also Comment, supra note 23, at 589.
152. See supra note 88.
153. Belmar Drive-In, 34 Ill. 2d at 548, 216 N.E.2d at 791.

154. See Comment, supra note 23, at 589; Brief, supra note 96, at 20.
155. Brief, supra note 96, at 20.
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tection of the direct sunlight needed for their solar devices, although they do have legislative definitions available for the granting of express solar skyspace easements. Precedent in the area of
watercourse law under the common law may be an argument used
to defend one's solar access. However, the landmark Wisconsin
case of Prah v. Maretti, following precedent similar in many ways
to Illinois common law, contains strong persuasive authority for
the Illinois courts to recognize a cause of action in private nuisance
for the obstruction of necessary sunlight.
THERESA BARNES-PIRKO

